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A Preliminary Analysis of the North Carolina Crime
Victims Compensation Act
In 1982 more than twenty-six thousand North Carolinians were victims of
violent crime.' Traditionally, the only means for a victim to recoup his losses
was to institute a civil suit against the offender.2 Two major practical
problems, however, may destroy the usefulness of a civil suit: a civil suit re-
quires that the offender be both apprehended, 3 and wealthy enough to make
the civil suit economically feasible. To aid the uninsured innocent victim, a
majority of states have enacted crime victims reparations programs.4 In 1983
the North Carolina General Assembly joined this trend by enacting North
Carolina General Statutes chapter 15B, the North Carolina Crime Victims
Compensation Act.5
The purpose of the Act is simple: to compensate victims for losses caused
by violent crimes. The Act, however, does not purport to compensate for
every crime. Section 15B-4 requires that a victim have been injured by "crimi-
nally injurious conduct. '" 6 This is defined as conduct that "by its nature poses
a substantial threat of personal injury or death, and is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or death."'7 The focus is solely on the perpetrator's conduct; the
victim of the crime is compensated by the Act even if the perpetrator lacked
the legal capacity to commit the crime.8 Because injury or death arising from
the operation of a motor vehicle is expressly excluded from the Act,9 a victim
will be unable to recover under the Act if his injuries are caused by one who,
1. CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1982 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 57. The Uniform Crime
Report defines "violent crime" to include murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Id.
2. North Carolina, like many other states, affords its citizen-victims another avenue for
compensation. A court can, as a condition to an inmate's probation, require him to make mone-
tary restitution to his victim. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(d) (1983). This remedy, however,
is mostly illusory. First, it assumes that someone has been convicted of the crime. Second, the
statute requires the court to consider the offender's financial status before awarding restitution.
Id. These drawbacks severely hamper the remedy.
3. Of the 26,000 violent crimes reported in this state in 1982, only 17,000 arrests were made.
CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 1, at 163. Thus, the civil remedy was available to, at best,
6 of the victims.
4. For a survey of 27 such programs, see Hoelzel,4 Survey of27 Victim Compensation Pro-
grams, 63 JUDICATURE 485 (1980). At least five justifications have been posited for these pro-
grams: (1) the state has assumed the responsibility for protecting its citizens, and when one is
victimized, the state has breached that obligation; (2) the programs are a result of a moral duty to
secure the public welfare; (3) the programs spread the risk of loss among all of society; (4) the
programs prevent victims from being alienated by society; and (5) most civil remedies are inade-
quate. See Clark & Webster, Indiana's Victim Compensation Act: A Comparative Perspective, 14
IND. L. REV. 751, 753-54 (1981).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15B-1 to -22 (1983). Attorney General Rufus Edmisten urged the
General Assembly to enact the program. Telephone interview with Representative Thomas C.
Womble, D-Forsyth (Feb. 27, 1984).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-4 (1983).
7. Id. § 15B-2(5). The injurious conduct must have taken place within the state.
8. Id. Thus, even if the offender was legally insane when the crime was committed, the
victim still can recover.
9. Id.
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for example, intentionally assaults him with an automobile. 10
Eligibility under the Act is governed by section 15B-2(2). To be eligible
for recovery, a person must be a victim or a dependent of a deceased victim. a'
"Victim" is defined as one who "suffers personal injury or death proximately
caused by criminally injurious conduct."' 2 A perpetrator or his accomplice
may not recover' 3 and a claim will be denied if it would benefit unjustly either
one.14 The Act further provides that unless "the interests of justice require," a
spouse, parent, child, sibling, or housemate of the offender or accomplice may
not recover.'
5
Recovery under the Act is limited to out-of-pocket "economic loss arising
from criminally injurious conduct."' 16 Economic loss includes any reasonable
medical and burial expenses. 17 Economic loss also includes any loss of in-
come the victim suffers, 18 as well as any expense the victim incurs hiring some-
one to perform the services he usually performs for his own or his dependents'
benefit.' 9 If the victim dies as a result of the crime, economic loss also in-
cludes any monetary loss the dependents suffer as a result of the victim's
death,20 including any expense the dependents incur in hiring someone to per-
form the services the victim usually performed for their benefit. 2 '
Recovery for "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, or
other nonpecuniary damage," however, is excluded specifically.22 This limita-
tion is consonant with the spirit of the Act-to compensate only for out-of-
pocket economic loss. The Act does recognize, however, that such emotional
damage may cause compensable economic harm.23 The Act also excludes
compensation for property losses, no matter how catastrophic they may be.24
10. This aspect of the North Carolina Act differs from the Uniform Crime Victims Repara-
tions Act. The latter excludes injuries arising out of the operation of motor vehicles unless the
conduct was "intended to cause personal injury or death." See UNIF. CRIME VICTIMs REPARA-
TIONS ACT, I1 U.L.A. 33 (1974) [hereinafter cited as UNIF. ACT]. See also ihra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(2) (1983).
12. Id. § 15B-2(13). The North Carolina Act and Uniform Act also differ on this point. In
North Carolina the injury or death must by "proximately caused" by the criminal conduct. Id.
The Uniform Act, however, compensates those who suffer injury or death as a result of a crime, a
good faith effort to prevent a crime, or a good faith effort to apprehend a suspect. See UNIF. ACT,
supra note 10, § l(i), at 37. See also infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(2) (1983).
14. Id. §15B-11(a)(3).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 15B4.
17. Id. § 15B-2(10). The Act labels these expenses "allowable expense[s]." A maximum of
$2000 is recoverable for burial expenses. Id. § 15B-2(l).
18. Id. § 15B-2(14) ("work loss").
19. Id. § 15B-2(12) ("replacement services loss").
20. Id. § 15B-2(7) ("dependent's economic loss").
21. Id. § 15B-2(8) ("dependent's replacement service loss").
22. Id. § 15B-2(10), (I1).
23. Id. § 15B-2(10). Thus, although a victim cannot recover for pain and suffering per se, he
may recover any lost wages that the pain and suffering cause him.
24. Exclusion of property losses is the overwhelming trend among the states. See Hoelzel,
supra note 4, at 485. Louisiana, however, allows recovery for "catastrophic property loss," which
is limited to "loss of abode." See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:1802(8)(c) (West 1982).
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This exclusion is based primarily on the assumption that allowing compensa-
tion for property losses would be too costly,25 and is a prime example of the
Act's goal of compensating solely for personal injury.
The dollar limits of the Act are straightforward. 26 A maximum of 2000
dollars is allowed for burial expenses. 27 All other economic loss is compensa-
ble up to a maximum of 200 dollars per week,28 and the maximum total com-
pensation payable to any victim or his dependents is 20,000 dollars.29
Furthermore, no compensation can be awarded if the victim's economic loss
totals less than 100 dollars.30
Compensation can be reduced or denied for several reasons. A claim
must be denied if the claimant failed to file his application for compensation
within two years of his injury.31 In addition, it is within the Commission's
discretion to deny a claim if the victim failed to report the criminal act to
police within three days of its occurrence.32
A claim can be reduced in three situations. If a victim's misconduct con-
tributed to his injury or death, the Commission may reduce the claim.33 If a
claimant failed to cooperate properly with any law enforcement agency, the
claim may be reduced or denied.34 Most importantly, the claimant's award is
reduced by any amount he recoups from collateral sources. 35 This provision is
designed to prevent double recovery.36
To administer the Act, the Crime Victims Compensation Commission
25. See Note, The Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 2 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 219-20 (1976).
26. These dollar limits illustrate the tension inherent in any compensation program. There is
a strong philanthropic desire to aid the injured victim, but, financial reality places a limit on state
largesse. As a result, the dollar limits represent a compromise of these competing interests.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(l) (1983).
28. Id. § 15B-ll(f).
29. Id. § 15B-1l(g).
30. Id. § 15B-l l(e). The minimum loss provision has been justified on the ground that it
"costs more to process [small] claims than the claim itself is worth." See Hoelzel, supra note 4, at
489.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11(a)(l) (1983).
32. Id. § 15B-11(a)(2). The Commission can waive this requirement upon a showing of
"good cause." Id. Presumably, the Commission can waive this requirement, and not the two-year
statute of limitations of section 15B-I l(a)(1), because of the relative shortness of a three-day
period.
33. Id. § 15B-11(b).
34. Id. § 15B-1 1(c). This recovery requirement will encourage citizen interest in law enforce-
ment. If a victim wishes to to be aided by the State, he must cooperate with the police. See
Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 487. It should be noted that the Act does not mention the necessity for
cooperation with the state prosecutor. Presumably, however, a court could construe "law enforce-
ment agency" to include a prosecutor.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-1 l(d) (1983). A collateral source is defined as a readily available
source of benefits from, inter alia, the offender, any government agency, social security, medicare,
medicaid, workers' compensation, or insurance. Id. § 15B-2(3).
36. See Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 488. The prevention of a double recovery is the antithesis of
the tort concept known as the collateral source rule. Under this rule, courts generally hold that
cash or in-kind benefits received by an injured plaintiff from a source collateral to and independ-
ent of the tortfeasor will not be set off against the plaintiff's recovery from the tortfeasor. Most
courts reach this result to prevent awarding a "windfall" to the defendant. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Milam, 115 Ga. App. 396, 397, 154 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1967) ("A tortfeasor can not diminish the
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was created and granted broad powers.37 The administrative machinery is set
in motion when a victim files an application for compensation with the Com-
mission.38 Each claim is assigned to an investigator, who conducts an initial
investigation. 39 Based on the application and the investigator's report, the
Commission director makes an initial decision on the claim. To be awarded
compensation, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the Act's requirements have been met.40 The perpetrator need not be
convicted for the claim to be successful; proof of conviction, however, is con-
clusive evidence that the crime was committed.
4 1
If the claimant is satisfied with the initial decision, the claim is submitted
to the Commission for its approval. If dissatisfied with the director's decision,
the claimant can appeal to the Commission for a full hearing.42 The claimant
may obtain judicial review of the Commission's decision in superior court.43
Thereafter, appeals are taken to the court of appeals "under rules of procedure
applicable in other civil cases."44 If compensation ultimately is awarded, the
State is subrogated to the claimant's rights to the extent of the compensation
paid.45
The General Assembly relied heavily on the Uniform Crime Victims
Reparations Act.46 In its final form, however, the North Carolina Act differs
from its model in a number of significant ways. A "victim" is defined in the
North Carolina Act as one "who suffers personal injury or death proximately
caused by" the crime.47 The Uniform Act, however, has a more comprehen-
sive definition of "victim." Under that Act, a "victim" is one who suffers in-
jury or death as a result of the crime, a good faith effort to prevent the crime,
or a good faith effort to apprehend one suspected of the crime.4 8 Thus, a key
question is whether the North Carolina Act is to be construed so that the
amount of his liability by pleading payments made to the plaintiff under the terms of a contract
between the plaintiff and a third party who was not a joint tortfeasor.").
In the compensation programs, however, there is no need to be concerned about a windfall
for the offender;, the victim and the state are the only interested parties. Since the aim of the
program is to aid a victim whose losses will come out of his own pocket, the program limits
recovery to those losses not covered by a collateral source.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15B-3, -6 (1983). The Commission consists of five members: three
appointed by the Governor, one appointed by the Senate, and one appointed by the House. Id.
§ 15B-3(a).
38. The application includes information relating to the criminal act, the injury, and the
victim's economic loss. See id. § 15B-7. The Commission can waive the $10 application fee for
claims brought by indigent victims. Id. § 15B-7(a).
39. Id. § 15B-10(a).
40. Id. § 15B-4.
41. Id. § 15B-14(a). Of course, the victim still must prove the other requirements of the Act.
42. Id. § 15B-10(b) to (d).
43. Id. §§ 15B-9, 150A-45.
44. Id. § 150A-52.
45. Id. § 15B-18(a). The State would have a civil remedy against the offender in the amount
of compensation paid to the victim.
46. UNIF. Acr, supra note 10.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(13) (1983).
48. UNIF. ACT, supra note 10, § l(i), at 37.
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"proximately caused" language includes persons injured as a result of trying to
prevent a crime or apprehend a suspected criminal.
Because the purpose of the Act is to compensate innocent victims of
crime, it is irrational not to compensate "good samaritans" who are injured.
Thus, the "proximately caused" language of the Act should be interpreted to
include good faith intervenors.49 In Sutton v. Duke5° the North Carolina
Supreme Court stated that for an act to be the proximate cause of a negli-
gently-caused injury, all that is required is "that a person of ordinary prudence
could have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or some similar injurious
result, was probable under the facts as they existed."'' s Since it is entirely
foreseeable that a good samaritan might be injured while coming to a victim's
aid, the North Carolina Act should be construed to allow compensation to
good faith intervenors.52
The North Carolina Act also differs from the Uniform Act by denying
compensation to a victim whose injury occurred while he was confined in
prison or jail.53 This provision is practically meaningless. Since only eco-
nomic loss is compensable, an inmate-victim ordinarily would recover only his
lost wages and out-of-pocket medical expenses. The State already provides
free medical care to inmates, 54 and few inmates earn a significant wage. Thus,
even without the limitation found in section 15B-11, there is little chance an
inmate would receive compensation.
The North Carolina and Uniform Acts also differ substantially regarding
compensation for injuries arising out of the operation of motor vehicles. The
North Carolina Act bars compensation for all injuries or deaths "arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle."'55 The Uniform Act
provides a similar limitation unless the crime was "intended to cause personal
49. The Act's sponsor, Representative Thomas C. Womble, stated that although the North
Carolina Act is not as explicit as the Uniform Act, "victim" is to be interpreted to include injured
good faith intervenors. Telephone interview with Representative Thomas C. Womble, D-Forsyth
(Feb. 27, 1984).
The term "proximate cause" is borrowed from the law of negligence. Countless pages have
been written on this complex and confusing subject. See, e.g., Agnihotri, Too Much Ado About
Something. Fate of Proximate Cause in Louisiana, 3 S.U.L. REV. 1 (1976); Reynolds, Limits on
Negligence Liability: Palsgraf at 50, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 63 (1979); Comment, Civil Liability For
Suicide: An Analysis of the Causation Issue, 1978 ARuz. ST. L.J. 573; Comment, House v. Keller-
man: Judge, Jury, and Intervening Cause in Kentucky Negligence Law, 64 KY. L.J. 889 (1976).
50. 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
51. Id. at 107, 176 S.E.2d at 169.
52. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that a person cannot be charged with con-
tributory negligence if he acts neither rashly nor recklessly in coming to the aid of a victim of
negligence. The tortfeasor's negligent act is seen as the proximate cause of the rescuer's injury.
See Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 380, 218 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1975).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-ll(a)(4) (1983). Representative Womble noted that this limita-
tion was enacted because it is not the intention of the Act to compensate an inmate injured, for
example, in a prison riot. One state that did not have this limitation was deluged with applica-
tions from inmates so injured. Telephone interview with Representative Thomas C. Womble, D-
Forsyth (Feb. 27, 1984).
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-19 (1983).
55. See id. § 15B-2(5).
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injury or death."' 56 North Carolina should amend its Act to conform with the
Uniform Act and allow compensation for intentional automobile-related inju-
ries. 57 Otherwise, the Act creates the anomaly that a person can recover if
someone shoots him, but not if someone intentionally strikes him with a car.
A literal reading of section 15B-2(5) also might preclude recovery for a victim
of a car bomb, since the injury arose "out of the. . . use of a motor vehicle."
Although cost reduction is the usual justification for barring recovery when an
automobile is involved,5 8 the Uniform Act's approach-by allowing recovery
for only intentionally inflicted injuries-would reduce costs while still compen-
sating the handful of victims who are assaulted intentionally with an
automobile.59
The Uniform Act contains a controversial optional provision that North
Carolina wisely did not adopt. The optional provision premises a victim's re-
covery on his financial situation; a claimant may recover only if he will suffer
"financial stress" as a result of his economic losses. "Financial stress" is de-
fined as an inability to maintain one's "customary level of health, safety, and
education" for oneself and one's dependents "without undue financial hard-
ship."'60 The purpose of this provision is to limit costs by not compensating
those who can take care of themselves. 61 This justification has three major
faults. First, the financial stress test "reads a welfare concept into a program
not related to welfare."62 The purpose of the Act is to compensate all innocent
victims, not just those below a certain income level. Second, the program al-
ready has a large cost-reduction provision that disallows recovery to the extent
the economic loss is recouped from collateral sources. 63 Third, it has been
suggested that it may be as costly to require the Commission to evaluate the
victim's financial need as it is to compensate all victims regardless of financial
stress. Thus, any savings made by disallowing recovery by wealthy victims
would be offset by the increased administrative costs.64 Since the justification
for the financial stress test is weak, North Carolina was wise not to adopt it.
56. UNIF. AcT, supra note 10, § l(e), at 36. Texas follows the Uniform Act on this point. See
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 3(4)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
57. Four reasons for disallowing recovery for victims of automobile-related crimes have been
suggested. First, automobile liability insurance provides an adequate remedy for the injured vic-
tim. Second, it may be too difficult to prove that the injury was intentionally inflicted. Third,
compensating these victims would be too costly. Fourth, "[m]otoring offenses are 'not the type of
offense about which the public is concer[n]ed."' Lamborn, The Scope of Programs For Govern-
mental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 21, 30-32.
58. See Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 492.
59. See CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 1, at 21, 57.
Rep. Womble stated that the reason for total exclusion for motor-vehicle-related injuries is
because the State should not become an automobile insurance company. Telephone interview
with Representative Thomas C. Womble, D-Forsyth (Feb. 27, 1984).
60. UNiF. ACT, supra note 10, § 5(g)(1), at 41. Texas decided to adopt this optional financial
stress test. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
61. See UNiF. AcT, supra note 10, at 42 (Commissioners' Comment).
62. Id.
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-ll(d) (1983); UNIF. AcT, supra note 10, § 5(f)(1), at 41.
64. UNiF. AcT, supra note 10, at 42 (Commissioners' Comment). Thirty percent of the aver-
age program's expenses is consumed by administrative costs. Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 488. In all
likelihood, this percentage is even greater in "financial stress" states.
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In addition to the departures from the Uniform Act, there will be other
problems in interpreting the North Carolina Act. In approaching the Act, one
must decide whether to construe the Act liberally to facilitate recovery, or con-
strue the Act strictly to save money. On the one hand, it is likely that any
funding by the General Assembly will be inadequate to compensate all vic-
tims.65 If the Commission or courts feel that the program is underfunded,
they may construe the Act strictly to preserve funds. On the other hand, most
programs with a humanitarian or social goal are construed liberally to facili-
tate recovery.66 Because the program is designed to aid innocent crime vic-
tims, any ambiguity in the Act should be resolved in favor of the victim.
One such interpretation problem will be the Act's definition of "crimi-
nally injurious conduct." It is defined as conduct "which by its nature poses a
substantial threat of personal injury or death." 67 This definition does not
identify adequately the compensable crimes. If a crime is covered only if it
intrinsically poses a "substantial threat" of injury, murder and assault clearly
are covered; burglary, however, is not. The better view would be to determine
if the criminal conduct poses a substantial threat of injury in fight of the par-
ticular circumstances. This view is preferable because the words "substantial
threat" modify the word "conduct." The emphasis is on the dangerousness of
the conduct, not on the dangerousness of the underlying crime.68 Thus, if the
crime was dangerous as carried out, as opposed to dangerous as defined in the
criminal code, the victim would be able to receive compensation.69
Another interpretation problem is the definition of work loss. Compensa-
ble work loss is defined in part as "loss of income from work that the injured
person would have performed if he had not been injured."'70 It has been ar-
gued that any loss of income caused by the crime should be covered under the
program. Proponents of this view favor compensating the injured victim for
wages lost because of a need to appear in court and testify against the offender.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in Hughes v. North Dakota Crime Vic-
tims Reparations Board,71 held that such lost wages were not covered. The
65. For example, the future of Indiana's program looked gloomy from its inception in 1978
until 1980 because of funding woes. The Indiana Commission stopped processing claims for six
months when the administrative funding was exhausted. See Clark & Webster, supra note 4, at
755-56.
66. See Note, supra note 25, at 199 ("[T]he Act is remedial in nature and thus should be
accorded a liberal construction in favor of the remedy provided by law, or in favor of those enti-
tled to the benefit of the statute."). See also Ames v. Texas, 656 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. App. 1983)
(Burdock, J., dissenting) (Act should be construed liberally in favor of victim). But S6 Hughes v.
North Dakota Crime Victim Reparations Bd., 246 N.W.2d 774, 776-77 (N.D. 1976) (when court
feels Act is unambiguous, it will not be given liberal construction).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(5) (1983).
68. See Note, supra note 25, at 211.
69. See id. The "dangerous as carried out" approach has been adopted by the Minnesota
Commission. Id. at 211 n.155. North Dakota avoided this interpretation problem by defining
"criminally injurious conduct" as criminal conduct that "results in bodily injury or death." See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-03(4) (Supp. 1983). Thus, in North Dakota the risk of injury or death
attendant to a particular crime is unimportant.
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(14) (1983).
71. 246 N.W.2d 774 (N.D. 1976).
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Hughes decision represents the proper interpretation. The statute clearly is
aimed at compensating the victim for wage loss caused by the injury he suf-
fered. In Hughes the victim's lost wages were not the result, directly or indi-
rectly, of his injury. Even if the victim had not been injured, he still would
have been required to testify against the offender.72 Section 15B-2(14) clearly
states that the loss must be attributable to the injury, and not just to the
crime.7
3
North Carolina General Statutes section 15B-1 l(a)(3) also may present an
interpretation problem. That section denies recovery if an award unjustly
would benefit the offender or his accomplice. Furthermore, unless "the inter-
ests of justice require," an award may not be made to a spouse, parent, child,
sibling, or housemate of the offender or his accomplice.74 These two require-
ments must be interpreted together.75 Thus, the interests of justice would re-
quire compensating an offender's innocent spouse unless the award would
benefit unjustly the offender himself. If, for example, the offender and his
victim are estranged spouses with no hope of reconciliation, an award would
be proper since it would not benefit the offender unjustly. Similarly, an eman-
cipated son who is assaulted by his father should recover. In this respect,
North Carolina was wise to reject the approach taken by Maryland. Under
the Maryland program, a victim cannot recover if he is a member of the of-
fender's family.76 This rule is too inflexible because it disallows recovery
merely because of a legal, blood, or social relationship with the offender. The
North Carolina approach, which emphasizes the unjust enrichment of the of-
fender, represents a view more in keeping with the policies underlying the Act.
In addition to problems of interpretation, two problems may arise in im-
plementing the North Carolina program. If the program is funded inade-
quately by the General Assembly, its effectiveness will be diminished severely.
As originally drafted, the program was to be funded by increased criminal
court costs. 77 This proposal was defeated. 78 Instead, the program will be
funded with general state revenues through the Department of Crime Control
72. Id. at 777 n.1.
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(14) (1983).
74. See id. § 15B-11(a)(3).
75. Maryland, unlike North Carolina, has made no conscious effort to emphasize the unjust
enrichment of the offender. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 5(b) (1981). North Carolina's provi-
sions were included so that an offender could not be benefited by an award. Assuming that a
victim meets every other requirement of the Act, the logical conclusion is that "justice requires"
compensating the victim if the award will not benefit the offender.
76. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 5(b) (1981). "Family" is defined as a person within the third
degree of consanguinity or affinity, a sexual partner, or a housemate. Id. § 2(d).
77. See N.C. House Bill 177 (1983) (as originally introduced). The rationale behind this
method of funding is to let the criminals pay for a program that is aimed at victims. Texas, for
example, funds its compensation program in this manner. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8309-1, § 14 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
78. This proposed method of funding was defeated for two principal reasons. First, the ma-
jority of criminal cases are traffic offenses, and thus the increased court costs really would not be
borne by "criminals." Second, the purpose of court costs is to pay the court's administrative ex-
penses, not to fund other programs. Interview with James Drennan, Associate Professor, North
Carolina Institute of Government (Feb. 27, 1984).
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and Public Safety.79 To date, no funds have been appropriated for the pro-
gram. To operate effectively, the program must receive adequate funds. The
Indiana program "had a precarious existence" from its inception in 1978 until
1980 because of inadequate funding.8 0 This should not be allowed to happen
in North Carolina.
The drafters of the Act attempted to protect against funding deficiencies.
The Act expressly states that if compensation is awarded when there are insuf-
ficient funds to pay the award, it nevertheless will be paid as soon as funds
become available.8 1 The Commission, however, probably would cease
processing claims if its administrative expenses could not be paid.82 A backlog
of unpaid claims would result. Thus, proper funding is imperative if the pro-
gram is to have a meaningful existence.
If the Act is to be effective, it is necessary that the victims it was intended
to benefit be made aware of the program. Even a properly funded program is
ineffective unless crime victims know it exists.8 3 The North Carolina Act en-
courages victim awareness by requiring law enforcement agencies to use "rea-
sonable efforts" to introduce the program to injured victims.3 4 Although this
is a step in the right direction, it may not be enough. The Act does not provide
for enforcement against an agency that is derelict in notifying victims. Such a
provision should be considered by the legislature if it is serious about full im-
plementation of the Act. Pursuant to its own power to publicize the pro-
gram,85 the Commission also could implement a comprehensive plan to
educate the public. Although any publicity drive will be restricted by limited
funds, the program could be featured in radio and television public service
announcements.
8 6
By enacting the North Carolina Crime Victims Compensation Act, the
79. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 832, § 6. The majority of the states fund their programs
with general state revenues. Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 492.
80. See Clark & Webster, supra note 4, at 755-56.
81. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-22 (1983).
82. In Indiana the Commission stopped processing claims when its administrative coffers
were emptied. Clark & Webster, supra note 4, at 755.
83. "A major shortcoming of every program is that most of its customers, victims of violent
crime, are not aware of it." H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF
CRIME 281 (1974). The best gauge of public ignorance is the percentage of victims who use the
programs. In California, for example, 200,000 people were victims of violent crime. Only
12,000-a mere 6%--applied for compensation. CiuM. JUST. NEWSLETTER, Nov. 7, 1983, at I.
Similarly, in 1974 only 3% of Alaska's, 12% of Hawaii's, 5% of Maryland's, and 2% of New York's
eligible victims applied for compensation. See Note, supra note 25, at 230 n.261.
Incredible as it may seem, some state legislatures have been reluctant to publicize their pro-
grams. The Nebraska legislature, for example, would allow no money to be spent on publicity
during the first year of the program (to limit the number of claims). Likewise, the Washington
legislature was "distraught" about the widespread publicity of that state's program. Hoelzel,supra
note 4, at 495.
84. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-20 (1983).
85. See id. § 15B-6(3).
86. Minnesota has a simple and relatively inexpensive program for informing potential
claimants. When the police investigate a crime, they give the victim a card that tells the victim
how to contact the compensation board. See Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 492.
Since the North Carolina Act allows compensation for reasonable attorneys' fees regardless
of a claimant's success, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-15(a) (1983), it is likely that a large number of
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General Assembly created a humanitarian program designed to aid injured
crime victims. If the program is to serve this benevolent purpose, three consid-
erations must be remembered. First, any ambiguities in the statute should be
construed in favor of the victim; the adequacy or inadequacy of appropriation
should not affect the construction given the Act. Second, it is imperative that
the program be funded adequately. The General Assembly should look to
other states to determine the level of funding a successful compensation pro-
gram demands. Third, it is crucial that the program be publicized widely.
Only if victims are aware of the program can it effectively serve both the citi-
zens of the State and the policies it was intended to promote.
KENNETH L. JONES
victims will be made aware of the program by their attorneys. See also Hcelzel, supra note 4, at
495.
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